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1. Introduction 
This article addresses what are often described as ‘complex adaptive systems.’ Typically such 
systems involve populations of entities that store and replicate information. But these micro 
aspects are less fully explored in most accounts, which concentrate on macro-outcomes of 
complex adaptive systems, particularly self-organisation and emergent properties. These 
omissions are addressed here, with a stress on the roles of individual habits and organisational 
routines. It is argued that such considerations open up the possibility of a meta-theoretical 
evolutionary framework for understanding complex adaptive systems. This essay also makes 
use of some insights from evolutionary and institutional economics and contrasts its approach 
with some standard assumptions in mainstream economics. 
The growing appreciation of the complexity of social as well as natural phenomena has 
promoted a diversity of responses, especially within the social sciences, including varieties of 
relativism, post-modernism and post-structuralism (Morçöl 2001). Important ideas within the 
complexity narrative include self-organisation, autopoiesis, emergent properties, requisite 
variety, non-linearity, path dependence, positive feedback, chaotic behaviour, and so on. But 
while these are important concepts, neither singly nor jointly do they amount to a unifying 
theory of complex phenomena. 
Is such a theory possible? Paul Cilliers (1998, p. ix) claims that complexity itself rules out 
such an over-arching theory. Notably his argument would apply to natural as well as social 
phenomena. Yet despite the complexity of the natural world, scientists have made 
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considerable progress in developing explanatory frameworks and theories, even if the task of 
prediction is often confounded by complexity. To take an example, while the human body is 
highly intricate, successful curative medicine is possible. 
Stephen Wolfram (2002) argues that complex phenomena can be generated by simple, 
algorithmic rules. While the outcomes are often unpredictable because of nonlinearities, their 
understanding and explanation centres on the generative algorithms or programs. A danger 
here is the conflation of reality with a computer simulation. Simple algorithms can give rise to 
complex outcomes but that does not mean that the complexity we find in reality has an 
equivalent and equally simple origin. 
The apparent absence of an unifying theoretical framework has encouraged the sceptics. 
One of these is John Horgan (1995) who critiqued the original claims of some complexity 
theorists (including those at the Santa Fe Institute) that they were in sight of a grand unifying 
theory of complex phenomena. 
I agree with Horgan that such a grand unifying theory is very far from our grasp. Its 
elevation to a major objective is a symptom of a tendency to excessive generalisation that has 
caused serious problems, at least in the social sciences. Among these is the neglect of 
historical and other specific phenomena and their specific roles and dynamics. Much of 
postwar economics and sociology has been diverted into a competitive quest for ever-greater 
generality and abstractness, to the reckless neglect of specific phenomena (Hodgson 2001). 
Despite the generation of a number of important insights, it is increasingly acknowledged that 
there is no unified and coherent narrative worthy of the title of ‘complexity theory’ (Anderson 
1999, Marion 1999). 
But both advocates and critics of ‘complexity theory’ have been diverted by universalities. 
The advocates have hunted for general principles that might apply to slime moulds, piles of 
sand, tree leaves, chemical reactions, astronomical bodies, weather systems and much else, 
including all human organisations and societies. Their very limited success is the cue for the 
critics, some of whom bemoan the failure to come up with anything remotely like Newton’s 
laws or the general theory of relativity. 
Any theorisation of complexity applied to human societies or organisations, addresses a 
specific set of phenomena. We consider some of the very basic features of this set and 
establish that they apply to a large class of natural phenomena as well. Furthermore, it is then 
possible to establish some general principles that apply to this broader domain. But the nature 
of these principles is very different from the aforementioned ‘laws’ that have been established 
in physics. 
I am concerned with complexity in human society. Consequently, I start the argument with 
the human agent, placed in a social and natural context, interacting with others. The 
ontological and epistemic complexity of this configuration is acknowledged. I then point to 
some basic cognitive and behavioural mechanisms that are necessary to deal with this 
complexity. There are some related but very different mechanisms in the natural world. There 
are also related mechanisms at the higher level of social organisation. These communalities at 
three different levels point to some limited over-arching principles relevant to all complex 
systems in this broad class. But before I outline the nature of these principles it is necessary to 
dispense with some rival claims, such as the universality and sufficiency of self-organisation 
theory. Once this is done I make a specific claim concerning the evolutionary character of 
most complex adaptive systems. This claim is well over a hundred years old, but it is 
relatively neglected, and some theorists may find it surprising. 
 - 3 - 
2. Adaptive populations 
Much of the work carried out under the rubric of complexity research makes quite specific 
ontological assumptions. Much of ‘complexity theory’ addresses not complex phenomena in 
general, but a particular form of complexity typically described by John Holland (1992), 
Brian Goodwin (1994), Stuart Kauffman (1995), Ralph Stacey (1996, 2003) and many others 
as a ‘complex adaptive system’. In practice, such systems are made up of multiple 
interconnected entities. In complex adaptive systems theory a number of agents interact with 
each other and together form a system that adapts to its environment. Also the individual 
entities are adaptive in that they have the capacity to change or learn from interaction and 
experience. A central question is: how do such complex non-linear systems function to 
produce ordered and novel patterns of behaviour, in the absence of any overall blueprint or 
ruling designer? We are dealing not merely with singular wholes, but with populations of 
adaptive agents that interact with others and form structured relations, which themselves adapt 
through time. 
Consider the basic nature and capacities of these agents. In real circumstances they need 
inputs of matter or energy to survive. They face a complex and changing social and natural 
environment, posing vital problems that require solutions. They can not only replicate and 
pass on some of their capacities and physical characteristics, but also they can communicate 
useful knowledge and techniques. This broad description applies to human society and to a 
large number of types of natural and artificial phenomena: but it is not universal. By 
sacrificing its universalist objective and specifying a particular ontology, complexity theory 
can make significant further progress. 
The predominant emphasis on the literature on complexity has been on the structure and 
adaptations of the system as a whole and not on the individual components. The explanatory 
focus has been on the possible emergence without design of organisation and orderly patterns 
of behaviour. This agenda is important and valuable. But it is one-sided. The emphasis has 
been on the complexity of the system, rather on the complexity of the components, their 
environments, and the adaptive problems that they face. Discourses on self-organisation, 
spontaneous order and autopoiesis acknowledge the interacting components, but often – 
perhaps in the pursuit of universal explanations – fail to consider adequately their particular 
characteristics and micro-contexts. 
I propose to bend the stick in the other direction. I shall concentrate first on the interacting 
agents and their complex environments. Macro-systemic considerations will be brought in 
later.  
The next section briefly reviews the treatment of agents and their environments in 
mainstream economics. After revealing various limitations, we consider contrasting 
approaches in dealing with complexity in the section after that. 
3. Hyper-rationality in mainstream economics 
Although mainstream economists urge us to take individuals and their incentives seriously, in 
their pursuit of the ‘science of choice’ they have overlooked the complexity of the decision 
environment, and the limitations of human cognitive and communicative capacities when 
faced with this complexity. They have assumed that individuals can perform immense feats of 
deliberation and calculation, or that it is legitimate to assume that individuals act ‘as if’ they 
had such capacities. It is only since the 1990s that these assumptions have been successfully 
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contested on mainstream terrain, despite the longstanding complaints of several heterodox 
critics including Thorstein Veblen (1898) and the Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon (1957). 
Even today, with significant mainstream acknowledgement of ‘bounded rationality’, 
contrary ideas remain entrenched in some quarters. The rational expectations hypothesis is 
still widely used in economic models: it assumes that outcomes do not differ systematically 
from what people expected them to be, and that people have the mental capacity to process all 
available information,. Significantly, some influential challenges to this hypothesis have used 
insights from chaos theory. Non-linearities make predictions by agents difficult or impossible 
(Akerlof and Yellen 1985, Grandmont 1987). The rational expectations hypothesis is also 
challenged by models where a small minority of agents are not fully rational. Outcomes can 
diverge radically from models where agents all have equivalent rational capacities 
(Haltiwanger and Waldman 1985).  
Despite all its emphasis on the individual, mainstream economics often assumes that 
individual preferences are similarly structured or identical, and that information-processing 
capacities are equivalent. Relaxation of these assumptions often leads to a breakdown of 
mainstream results (Arrow 1986). 
Furthermore, although economists have relaxed the ‘perfect information’ assumptions of 
earlier decades, to embrace various forms of incomplete or imperfect information, cognitive 
divergences are rarely acknowledged. The ‘Harsanyi doctrine’ is still commonplace: this 
attributes differences in individuals’ beliefs entirely to differences in information and upholds 
that every individual interprets information in the same way. Yet in reality cognitive 
divergences are typical. That is one reason why conversation and communication are 
important. They help (with limited success) to overcome different interpretations and 
establish some common meanings. Cognitive divergence is an important facet of the 
complexity that we all face in social interactions, yet the Harsanyi doctrine assumes it away. 
Game theory is at the cutting edge of mainstream economics. One form of game theory 
assumes not only that agents are rational, but also they know and fully take into account the 
rationality of others: this is the ‘common knowledge of rationality’ assumption. But some 
game theorists have moved away from this supposition of hyper-rational agents, with 
theoretical results that are strikingly different from those where common knowledge of 
rationality is assumed (Gintis 2000, Camerer 2003). 
Overall, mainstream economics has only partially moved away from assumptions of agent 
rationality and homogeneity. Where such moves have been made, they have led to very 
different results. Mainstream economics has half-opened the Pandora’s Box of complexity but 
does not know how to keep its contents under control. 
4. The nature of habit 
Contrasting assumptions are found in non-mainstream thought, including within evolutionary 
and institutional economics. By contrast, these approaches start from the assumptions of 
heterogeneous agents, cognitive divergence, and complex interaction. Known forms of 
mathematical analysis meet barriers of intractability in such circumstances, and consequently 
one has to fall back on indicative theorising including agent-based computer models, case 
studies and historical research. 
Rather than starting a priori from relatively simple models of rational individuals and 
trying to draw logical conclusions from their assumptions, these approaches rely much more 
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heavily on psychological and cognitive research to understand how boundedly rational agents 
deal with uncertainty and complexity. The work of William James (1890) is highly relevant 
here. He founded a school in psychology that stresses the role of habits in dealing with 
complexity and uncertainty. His work inspired evolutionary and institutional economists such 
as Veblen (1898, 1914), philosophers such as John Dewey (1922) and is enjoying a 
renaissance today (Johnson and Henley 1990, Plotkin 1994). 
Instincts are inherited biologically. By contrast, habits are conditional propensities moulded 
by environmental circumstances and transmitted culturally rather than biologically. The 
mechanisms of habit are largely unconscious, but they may press on our awareness. Habits are 
submerged repertoires of potential behaviour; they can be triggered or reinforced by an 
appropriate stimulus or context. The meaning of habit adopted by James (1890), Veblen 
(1898) and Dewey (1922) was of an acquired proclivity or capacity, which may or may not be 
actually expressed in current behaviour. A similar interpretation of habit as a disposition is 
found in the work of contemporary psychologists (Ouellette and Wood 1998, Wood et al. 
2002, Wood and Neal 2007). 
Brain imaging studies on human subjects (Poldrack et al., 2001) show that the formation of 
habits involves a shift away from parts of the brain associated with conscious, declarative 
memory and goal-setting (the medial temporal lobe and pre-frontal cortex) towards areas 
associated with procedural memory and context-triggered responses (the basal ganglia). 
This conception of habit contrasts with that used by some other authors. For example, the 
Nobel economist Gary Becker (1992, p. 328) wrote: ‘I define habitual behavior as displaying 
a positive relation between past and current consumption’. Becker here defines habit not as a 
behavioural propensity but as sequentially correlated behaviour. In contrast, the view of habit 
here is of a disposition, which, once acquired, is not necessarily realised in any future 
behaviour. Habit is a causal mechanism, not a set of correlated events. Repeated behaviour is 
important in establishing a habit. But if we acquire a habit we do not necessarily use it all the 
time. 
5. Habits and complex environments 
In terms of energy requirements, the brain is very expensive. While it accounts for less than 
two per cent of our weight, it consumes up to twenty per cent of our calorific intake (Drubach 
2000). Bigger brains mean that we have to consume more calories, and our ancestors had to 
spend more time on hunting and gathering. The evolution of the human brain was a trade-off 
between its survival advantages and its energy costs. 
Rather than trying to amass and process all information, habit is a much cruder way of 
storing information from past experience. It vastly economises on brain storage capacity. 
Habit crudely encapsulates past adaptive behaviour: much information is not retained. The 
capacity to form habits has evolved in humans to cope with complex changing environments 
with large amounts of information, given the limited capacity and energy costs of the human 
brain. 
The role of habit is illustrated by an agent-based computer simulation developed by 
Thorbjørn Knudsen and myself (Hodgson and Knudsen 2004a). The simulation considers the 
evolution of a traffic convention, concerning whether to drive on the left or right side of a 
circular track. Agents make decisions through weighted combinations of ‘rational 
deliberation’ on current information and habitual dispositions to drive on one side rather than 
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the other. The most important result of these simulations concerns the effect of introducing 
habit into the modelling of agent behaviour. In most of parameter space, strength of habit can 
increase the systemic rate of convergence towards a left/right convention. In some 
circumstances it can also enhance systemic resistance to error. In short, habit helps agents to 
deal with uncertainty, complexity and change. It requires less mental storage capacity than 
fully rational deliberation. 
Another computer simulation that illustrates the role of habits (or similar rule-like 
behavioural dispositions) in complex environments was performed by Giovanni Dosi, Luigi 
Marengo, Andrea Bassanini and Marco Valente (1999). Their work addresses the 
computability and complexity of the decision procedures of agents. Instead of taking an 
axiomatic approach grounded on the principles of rationality and optimisation, they use 
algorithms where decisions are evolving outcomes of processes of learning and adaptation to 
the particular environment in which the decision must be made. They apply genetic 
programming (Koza 1992) to agent behaviour in oligopolistic markets. Consistent with 
evidence of the behaviour of real economic agents, the simulation shows that the response to 
complexity is often to increase the reliance on behaviour driven by relatively simple rules.  
Both simulations establish that the higher the ratio between the complexity of the 
environment, on the one hand, and the informational and deliberative capacities of agents, on 
the other, the more that agents have to rely on something like habit, and the more efficacious 
it becomes in the circumstances. Habit is a vital psychological mechanism to deal with 
complexity and change. 
Often acquired through cultural transmission, habits serve as means of learning skills and 
fixing useful knowledge in human societies. Anthropologists Peter Richerson and Robert 
Boyd (2001) have argued that human capacities to develop and transmit a sophisticated 
culture evolved during periods of rapid climate change, when the relatively rapid transmission 
of useful knowledge on how to adapt to the environment was vital. Biologically inherited 
instincts have important uses, but they change far too slowly to accommodate new knowledge 
in complex and changing environments. 
Without habits our brains cannot deal with the vast amounts of information involved. For 
example, when using a language, we cannot deliberate upon every element. Such calculations 
would bring discourse to a halt. We have to rely on acquired habits to deal with standard 
linguistic rules, so that the brain is freed up to contemplate higher-level decisions. Similar 
remarks apply to all human skills of thought or behaviour. In a complex world, habit is a 
necessary foundation for our knowledge and skills. 
6. From habits to organisational routines 
In everyday parlance the word ‘routine’ is used loosely to refer to repeated sequences of 
behaviour, by individuals as well as by organizations. But when Richard Nelson and Sidney 
Winter (1982) used the concept in their seminal work on economic and organizational 
evolution, and repeated the metaphor of ‘routines as genes’, they suggested a more specific 
and technical meaning for the term. It is important to clarify and refine this technical meaning. 
A consensus has now emerged that routines relate to groups or organizations, whereas 
habits relate to individuals (Cohen et al. 1996, Dosi et al. 2000). Individuals have habits; 
groups have routines. But routines do not simply refer to habits that are shared by many 
individuals in an organization or group. Routines are not themselves habits: they are 
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organizational meta-habits, existing on a substrate of habituated individuals in a social 
structure. Routines are one ontological layer above habits themselves. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) refer repeatedly to ‘routines as genes’. This is another useful 
analogy. But of course, as these authors emphasise, routines are very different from genes. 
Routines do not replicate biologically and they are much less enduring. All analogies are 
inexact in some respects and must be handled with care. The gene analogy usefully points to 
routines as relatively durable carriers of information through shorter periods of time, with the 
capacity to generate particular outcomes in given circumstances. Routines are like genes in 
the abstract sense that they are both generative, rule-like structures and potentialities. 
Contrary to some ambivalence in the literature, routines (like habits) are best treated as 
stored behavioural capacities or capabilities rather than behaviour as such (Hodgson 2008). 
Consider a firm in which all employees and managers work between 9am and 5pm only. 
During this working day a number of organizational routines can be energized. At other times 
the firm is inactive. But the routines do not all disappear at 5pm, to reappear mysteriously the 
next day. The routines-as-capacities remain, as long as the individuals have the potential and 
disposition to work again together in the same context. Subject to this condition, the routines 
can be triggered the next day by appropriate stimuli. 
Routines energize a series of conditional, interlocking, sequential behaviours among 
individuals within the organization (Cohen and Bacdayan 1994). Routines depend upon a 
structured group of individuals, each with particular habits, where many of these depend upon 
procedural memory. The behavioural cues by some members of a structured assembly of 
habituated individuals triggers specific habits in others. Hence various individual habits 
sustain each other in an interlocking structure of reciprocating individual behaviours. 
Together these behaviours take on collective qualities associated with teams. The organization 
or group provides a structured social and physical environment for each individual, including 
rules and norms of behaviour, of both the explicit and the informal kind. This environment is 
made up of the other individuals, the relations between them and the technological and 
physical artefacts that they may use in their interactions. This social and physical environment 
enables, stimulates and channels individual activities, which in turn can help trigger the 
behaviour of others, produce or modify some artefacts, and help to change or replicate parts of 
this social and physical environment. 
Hence organizations have important additional properties and capacities that are not 
possessed by individuals, taken severally. The organization provides the social and physical 
environment that is necessary to enable specific activities, cue individual habits and deploy 
individual memories. If one person leaves the organization and is replaced by another, then 
the new recruit may have to learn the habits that are required to maintain specific routines. 
Just as the human body has a life in addition to its constituent cells, the organization thus has 
a life in addition to its members. The additional properties of the whole stem from the 
structured relations and causal interactions between the individuals involved (Blitz 1992, 
Hodgson 2004, Weissman 2000). 
The above discussion has established that, in addition to genes at the biological level, there 
are additional information-carrying mechanisms in human societies, namely habits at the 
individual level and routines at the organisational level. An abstract communality exists, 
despite huge differences at the level of detail. The significance of this point will be developed 
later. But we are already hinting at the possibility of extending the use of Darwinian 
principles beyond the biological sphere. 
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7. Self-organisation versus Darwinism? 
Emergent properties are a facet of ‘self-organisation’. Organisations have undesigned 
properties that are not features of individuals, taken severally. Let us tackle the relationship 
between self-organisation and Darwinism, before elaborating the relevance of the latter and 
returning to the role of habits and routines. 
Much has been written on how our knowledge of complexity should modify the Darwinian 
theory of evolution, particularly through the acknowledgement of the role of self-organisation 
(Depew and Weber 1995). Some interpreters of this work go so far as to suggest that self-
organization provides an alternative to Darwinian theory. These interpretations are mistaken, 
both in terms of their misunderstanding of the claims of leading theorists of self-organisation, 
and in the viability of their claim. 
Self-organization may be necessary to explain the emergence of a number of complex 
phenomena. But in the absence of selection there is little chance of the development of 
increasingly complex structures. Thus, rather than being alternatives, Kauffman (1993, p. 
465) saw a ‘natural marriage of self-organization and selection.’ He and several other 
pioneers of self-organization theory do not present their argument as an alternative to 
Darwinian theory. Jeffrey Wicken (1987) wrote of ‘extending the Darwinian paradigm,’ not 
exterminating it. David Depew and Bruce Weber (1995) considered ‘Darwinism evolving,’ 
not Darwinism abandoned. Weber and Depew (1996, p. 51) wrote: 
the very concept of natural selection should be reconceived in terms that bring out its 
dynamical relationships with chance and self-organization. In our view, Kauffman’s 
recent work, as expressed in The Origins of Order, does just this. 
What is involved here is a revision and extension of natural selection theory, not its negation. 
Kauffman (1995, p. 8) himself called for a ‘revision of the Darwinian worldview’ not its 
abandonment. As Kauffman (1993, p. 644) also related: 
I have tried to take steps toward characterizing the interaction of selection and self-
organization. … Evolution is not just ‘chance caught on the wing.’ It is not just a 
tinkering of the ad hoc, of bricolage, of contraption. It is emergent order honored and 
honed by selection. 
Once self-organized systems and subsystems emerge, natural selection acts upon these self-
organized structures once they emerge. Far from being an alternative to natural selection, self-
organization requires it in order to determine which self-organized units have survival value. 
Accordingly, other self-organization theorists, such as the biologists Scott Camazine and his 
colleagues, similarly recognize that self-organization complements rather than displaces the 
‘orthodoxy’ of natural selection. Echoing Kauffman, Camazine et al. (2001, p. 89) write, 
There is no contradiction or competition between self-organization and natural selection. 
Instead, it is a cooperative ‘marriage’ in which self-organization allows tremendous 
economy in the amount of information that natural selection needs to encode in the 
genome. In this way, the study of self-organization in biological systems promotes 
orthodox evolutionary explanation, not heresy. 
Consequently, evolutionary economists who propose that self-organization theory is an 
alternative to Darwinian principles are at variance with their prominent mentors in self-
organization theory. Leading theorists of self-organization recognize that natural selection is 
required at some point in the explanation. 
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Crucially, an exclusive focus on self-organization concentrates on the development of the 
entity, neglecting its interactions with its environment and providing no adequate explanation 
of how the entity comes to be adapted to survive in this environment (Cziko 1995). The 
mistake is to concentrate entirely on internal development and evolution from within, even to 
the extent of defining evolution in these narrow and unwarranted terms. 
On the contrary, in biology, neither individuals, species, nor ecosystems are entirely ‘self-
transforming.’ Evolution takes place within open systems involving both endogenous and 
exogenously stimulated change. Generally, evolution takes place both through internal 
changes and interactions with the (possibly changing) environment. 
8. The Darwinian evolution of complex adaptive systems 
Darwin himself (1859, pp. 422-3, 1871, vol. 1, pp. 59-61, 106) hinted at the possibility that 
his core principles might apply to other evolving systems, such as human language. This 
insight was taken up by others in the nineteenth century (Ritchie 1896, Veblen 1899) revived 
later in the twentieth century (Campbell 1965), but is only recently receiving wider attention. 
Theorists working in this area suggest that in typical ‘complex adaptive systems’ Darwinian 
core principles are not only relevant but ultimately unavoidable. Importantly, there is no 
adequate rival over-arching theory to deal with these systems. 
Most ‘complex adaptive systems’ involve populations of adaptive agents that interact with 
others and form structured relations, which themselves adapt through time. To emphasise 
their population properties, they are described elsewhere as ‘complex population systems’ 
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2006, Aldrich et al. 2008). 
By definition, entities in complex population systems face specific problems that have to be 
solved to minimize degradation and raise the chances of survival. In short, these entities are 
engaged in a struggle for existence, to use the term adopted by Darwin (1859, pp. 62-63). 
We also assume some capacity to retain and pass on to others workable solutions to 
problems faced in the struggle for existence. Examples include tools and technological know-
how. Retaining such problem solutions or adaptations means avoiding the risks and labour of 
learning them anew. Given that the entities in the population are mortal and degradable, there 
are also good reasons to assume that some capacity exists to pass on to others information 
about such workable solutions. This is the basis of the Darwinian principle of inheritance. 
In sum, a complex population system involves populations of non-identical (intentional or 
non-intentional) entities that face locally scarce resources and problems of survival. Some 
adaptive solutions to such problems are retained through time and may be passed to other 
entities. Examples of such complex population systems are plentiful both in nature and in 
human society. They include the ensembles of every biological species, from amoebas to 
humans. In addition, they include collections of human organisations such as business firms, 
as long as these organisations are cohesive entities with a capacity to retain and replicate 
problem solutions. 
Crucially, an adequate explanation of the evolution of such a system must involve the three 
Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection. These are the broad Darwinian 
theoretical requirements. They do not themselves provide all the necessary details, but 
nevertheless they must be honoured. Otherwise the explanation of evolution will be 
inadequate.  
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Consider the three Darwinian principles in turn. Each principle is an explanatory 
requirement. First, there must be some explanation of how variety is generated and 
replenished in a population. In biological systems the answers – established since Darwin’s 
death – involve genetic recombination and mutations. By contrast, the evolution of social 
institutions involves innovation, imitation, planning and other mechanisms very different 
from the detailed processes found in biology (Aldrich and Ruef 2006). The general problem 
of the existence and replenishment of variety remains a vital question of evolutionary research 
in the social and technological domain (Metcalfe 1998, Nelson 1991, Saviotti 1996). 
Innovations are a common source of new variation, but the determinants of such novelties are 
not fully understood.  
Second, there must be an explanation of how useful information concerning solutions to 
particular adaptive problems is retained and passed on. This requirement follows directly from 
the broad nature of the complex population system that we are required to explain, in which 
there must be some mechanism by which adaptive solutions are copied or passed on. In 
biology these mechanisms often involve genes and DNA. In social evolution we may include 
the replication of habits, customs, rules and routines, all of which may carry solutions to 
adaptive problems (Veblen 1899, Nelson and Winter 1982, Hayek 1988). There must be some 
mechanism that ensures that some such solutions (embodied in habits, routines or whatever) 
endure and replicate; otherwise the continuing retention of useful knowledge would be 
impossible. 
Third, and not least, there must be an explanation of the fact that entities differ in their 
longevity and fecundity. In given contexts, some entities are more adapted than others, some 
survive longer than others, and some are more successful in producing offspring or copies of 
themselves. Here the principle of selection comes in. Selection involves an anterior set of 
entities, each interacting with its environment and somehow being transformed into a 
posterior set where all members of the posterior set are sufficiently similar to some members 
of the anterior set, and where the resulting frequencies of posterior entities depend upon their 
properties in the environmental context (Price 1995, Andersen 2004, Knudsen 2004). Through 
selection, a set of entities, a population, will gradually adapt in response to the criteria defined 
by an environmental factor. Thus in a cold environment, the proportion of mammals with 
more fat or long fur is likely to increase.  
The principle of selection is different from the principle of variation. The latter is the 
requirement for some explanation of the sources and replenishments of variety. Selection 
refers to the mechanisms that bring about the survival of some variations rather than others, 
often reducing variety. Even when both variety-creation and selection involve human agency, 
as often is the case in the human domain, the two processes are quite different. Innovation is 
about the creation of new variations; selection is about how they are tested in the real world.  
Note that outcomes of a selection process are necessarily neither moral nor just. 
Furthermore, there is no requirement that outcomes of a selection process are necessarily 
optimal or improvements on their precursors. Insofar as these outcomes carry connotations of 
refinement or efficiency, it is efficiency relative to the given environment, and efficiency that 
is tolerable rather than optimal. Darwinism does not assume that selection brings about 
globally efficient or (near) optimal outcomes, and in certain instances selection can even lead 
to systematic errors (Hodgson 1993). There is no reason to believe that the special 
requirements needed to asymptote global efficiency are generally prevalent in nature or 
society (Winter 1964, Gould 2002). 
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Without honouring the principle of selection, we have no way of explaining how some 
entities or their offspring prevail over others. The principle is widely held to apply in the 
natural world; the fitter members of the species often have greater chances of survival and 
procreation. This helps to explain how species become adapted to their environment. But the 
move from the natural to the social world does not undermine the principle of selection. Even 
if there is not a fierce life-and-death struggle between rival customs or institutions, some 
explanation is required of why some enjoy greater longevity than others, why some are 
imitated more than others, and why some diminish and decline. Any such explanation must 
come under the general rubric of selection, as defined above. 
Darwin’s principles of variation, inheritance and selection are required not only to explain 
evolution within populations but also the origins of those populations themselves. Overall, as 
long as there is a population with imperfect inheritance of their characteristics, not all of them 
having the same potential to survive, then Darwinian evolution will occur. 
9. Conclusion: habits, routines and Darwinian evolution 
If Darwinian principles apply to social as well as biological entities, then we need to search 
for the appropriate units of selection, replication and variation at the social level. Richard 
Dawkins (1976) suggested the ‘meme’ as the answer, vaguely defined as ideas, brain patterns 
or behaviours. But even if becomes fashionable, the coining of a new word does not solve the 
problem of explaining the mechanics of social evolution. The ‘meme’ beholds more problems 
than it gives answers. 
Recent work in the philosophy of social and biological evolution (Sterelny et al. 1996, 
Godfrey-Smith 2000, Hull et al. 2001) has established general definitions of the common 
abstract units and processes in Darwinian evolution. Developing and using these definitions, 
Thorbjørn Knudsen and myself (Hodgson and Knudsen 2004b, 2006) have established that 
psychological or organisational entities such as habits or routines can be treated as replicators, 
and organisations such as business firms can be treated as ‘interactors’ (Hull 1988) – the 
generalisation of the phenotype concept in biology. This work brings us closer to a ‘genetics’ 
of social evolution, but the detailed mechanisms involved are very different from those found 
in the biological domain. 
Generally, organisms, individuals or organizations develop mechanisms to acquire, retain 
and enact relatively simple heuristics or ‘rules of thumb’ to cope with complexity. Among 
such mechanisms are (biologically inherited) instincts, (culturally inherited) habits and 
(culturally transmitted) routines within organizations. These ‘simple heuristics that make us 
smart’ (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999) economise hugely on both memory and computational 
capacity, and they can be replicated relatively easily. A disadvantage is that they are relatively 
rigid and difficult to adjust. The more complex and adaptive entities develop higher-order 
habits or routines to scrutinise lower-order habits or routines. In society as well as nature, a 
further means by which instincts, habits or routines adjust in a population of entities is by the 
selective demise of organisms, individuals or organizations that fail to adapt to their 
environment, or to discover or create suitable niches for survival. 
In sum, the Darwinian approach provides an over-arching framework for further theoretical 
and empirical exploration into the detailed mechanisms involved in learning, knowledge 
transfer, organisational competition, and organisational change. 
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Note that complexity comes into this account in at least two important ways. Accounts of 
complex adaptive systems rightly emphasise the complexity of the interactions between 
entities, the existence of emergent properties as a result of their interaction, and the 
unpredictability of outcomes. This is complexity largely from a macro perspective. 
Less prominent in the complexity literature are discussions of the complexity facing agents 
and the psychological or other mechanisms that are required to deal with it. In the approach to 
social evolution summarised here, individual habits and organisational routines are different 
replicators and part of the multilevel evolutionary process in society. 
In a Darwinian framework, social evolution is addressed simultaneously from both a macro 
and a micro perspective. This dual micro-macro approach raises new questions concerning 
complexity. Both natural and social evolution have led to the emergence of highly complex 
phenomena. In human society in particular the complexity of social organisation has increased 
vastly in the last few hundred years. 
We know that in the biological sphere genetic information changes only very slowly. By 
contrast, habits are much more malleable. Individual habits can be formed in response to 
institutional and cultural circumstances. This is a version of ‘reconstitutive downward 
causation’ where system properties lead to changes in individual dispositions and capacities 
(Emmeche et al. 2000, Hodgson 2003, Hodgson and Knudsen 2005). 
A relevant question is what are the characteristics of replicators that permit such an increase 
of complexity in the system as a whole? An attempt to answer this question is in another 
paper (Hodgson and Knudsen 2008). This paper argues that to enhance the potential for 
complexity in the system, the replicator must store instructions to guide the development of 
the relevant interactor. Consequently, the approach outlined here has a ‘positive heuristic’ that 
lays out new research questions and begins to provide some answers. 
Such micro aspects of ‘complex adaptive systems’ are given less emphasis in much of the 
previous complexity literature. It is necessary to acknowledge that such systems are composed 
of populations of entities that face problems of complexity and survival in their local 
environments. Darwinism provides a meta-theoretical framework for beginning to analyse 
such systems from both a macro and a micro perspective. It does not provide all the answers 
and it always requires specific auxiliary theorising at every level. That is part of the beauty of 
Darwinism; it provides a multi-level, micro-macro perspective that does not claim to explain 
or predict everything. Yet with such complex population systems the Darwinian principles of 
inheritance, variety and selection are unavoidable. It is no exaggeration to claim that Darwin 
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